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We examine how globalization affects trade patterns and welfare when conflict prevails 
domestically. We do so in a simple model of trade, in which a natural resource like oil is 
contested by competing groups using real resources (”guns”). Thus, conflict is viewed as 
ultimately stemming from imperfect property-rights enforcement. When comparing autarky 
with free trade in such a setting, the gains from trade have to be weighed against the possibly 
higher resource costs of conflict. We find that importers of the contested resource gain 
unambiguously. By contrast, countries exporting the contested resource will lose under free 
trade, unless the international price of the resource is sufficiently high. Regardless of what 
price obtains in international markets, countries tend to over-export the contested resource 
relative to what we would observe if there were no conflict; for some range of prices, the 
presence of conflict even inverts the country's comparative advantage. We find further that an 
increase in the international price of the contested resource over an even wider range reduces 
welfare, an instance of the “natural resource curse.” 
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1 Introduction
In the debate regarding the eﬀects of globalization, economists often take
the rigorous neoclassical paradigm of trade as their starting point.1 The
canonical versions of that paradigm assume that property rights are perfectly
and costlessly enforced. Under such conditions, the eﬀects of greater trade
openness and, more generally, of globalization are typically found to be
beneﬁcial. However, in many circumstances, property rights are either not
well-deﬁned or are costly to enforce. Thus, it is only natural to ask how
such deviations from the canonical paradigm of trade would inﬂuence our
assessment of the eﬀects of globalization.2
For the most part, economic analyses of imperfectly enforced property
rights have concentrated on open-access resources—ﬁsheries, environmen-
tal resources, the commons in general—in which over-exploitation is the
main source of ineﬃciency. With regard to the eﬀects of globalization,
Chichilnisky (1994) and Brander and Taylor (1998) have shown how remov-
ing the barriers to trade of an open-access resource can further stimulate its
over-exploitation and lead to lower welfare.3
In this paper, we adopt a diﬀerent approach, one that enables us to
explore an altogether diﬀerent set of ineﬃciencies arising from imperfect
property-rights enforcement in relation to globalization—namely, the costs
of enforcement and conﬂict within a country.4 Some costs of enforcement,
1See, for example, Bhagwati’s (2004) multi-faceted discussion and argument in support
of the net beneﬁts of globalization. Stiglitz (2002) provides a diﬀerent view, emphasizing
the role of ﬁnance and international organizations, such as IMF and the World Bank.
2The speciﬁcation and enforcement of property rights in a modern economy would
seem to require (i) the presence of a state that can deﬁne these rights legislatively, (ii) an
independent judiciary and non-corrupted power to enforce them, and (iii) the ﬁscal abil-
ity to maintain that infrastructure. Olson (2000, p.183) dubbed the modern markets that
require property rights speciﬁcation and enforcement, in contrast to the spontaneous mar-
kets of much of history that can rely on self-enforcement, as socially-contrived. However,
even a near-complete speciﬁcation of property rights cannot ensure costless enforcement.
Given the resources devoted to enforcement by the state, individual parties may need to
spend time or money on litigation and related activities to defend their rights.
3Hotte et. al. (2000) examine the eﬀect of trade in an open-access resource but also
allow for private enforcement and its evolution in a dynamic context.
4Skaperdas and Syropoulos (2001) and Skaperdas and Syropoulos (2002) have adopted
this approach to explore the welfare consequences of greater openness in the presence
of conﬂict between nations who possibly trade with the rest of the world. See Barbieri
and Schneider (1999) for a review of the recent scholarship, produced largely though not
exclusively by political scientists, on trade and conﬂict. This scholarship has resulted
primarily in two opposing views: (i) the liberal view, that trade between nations would
promote peace; and (ii) the realist view, that the eﬀect of trade would have a negativeGlobalization and domestic conﬂict 2
such as those reﬂected in the resources regularly expended in litigation and
related activities as individuals and groups try to protect their rights, are ob-
served everywhere, even in high-income countries. Many countries, however,
face more severe and costly enforcement problems that manifest themselves
in a variety of forms of domestic conﬂict, including strikes and lockouts, mil-
itary coups, low-level ethnic, religious or class rivalries, as well as rampant
basic insecurity that the state is simply unable to curtail. As Rodrik (1998,
1999) has argued, managing such conﬂicts is critical for successful economic
development. Perhaps an even more important case of problematic enforce-
ment is simply that of civil wars. The economic costs of civil conﬂicts have
been overwhelming during the post-World War II period. The costs range
from the resources allocated directly to arming and those destroyed in the
struggle to the indirect losses associated with a reduction in investment and
trade due to greater insecurity as well as other allocative eﬀects that can
extend well beyond the duration of the war.5
We suppose that a potentially tradeable natural resource, like oil, is
contested by diﬀerent domestic groups.6 The degree of openness to interna-
tional markets faced by the contending parties aﬀects not only the stakes of
the contest (the value of the disputed resource), but the opportunity costs
of contestation and conﬂict as well. To highlight the ways in which openness
matters, we examine conﬂict in a small country under two polar regimes:
eﬀect or, at best, no eﬀect.
5Recent studies of these eﬀects, conducted by researchers at the World Bank, are
distilled in Collier et. al. (2003). With the methodology developed by Lucas (1987) to
estimate the welfare costs of the business cycle, Hess (2003) estimates the welfare costs of
conﬂict coming from its eﬀects on consumption alone, to be, on average, for 147 countries
from 1960–1992, 8 percent of steady-state consumption. The individual estimates for
some countries are, not surprisingly, a bit smaller. For the United States, for example, the
estimated cost is 3.2 percent. However, even this estimate is far greater than the Lucas-
type estimate of the welfare cost of the business cycle in the United States [Hess, p. 17].
Moreover, the estimates for some lower-income countries are dramatically higher—e.g.,
the cost is 65 percent in Iraq and 40.5 percent in Angola.
6For an overview of the various contested natural resources around the globe and the
problems they induce, see Klare (2001). There is now a fairly sizeable empirical literature
on the relationship between a country’s natural resource wealth and civil war. As discussed
by Ross (2004) in his synthesis and review, the evidence is quite mixed; and while there
appear to be some regularities, very little has been done to distinguish between diﬀerent
theoretical explanations. To get a ﬂavor for some of the diﬃculties inherent in empirical
work of this kind, see Sambanis (2004), who applies the qualitative methodology of cases
studies to ﬁll in the gaps left by formal-quantitative models of civil war to help uncover
new and changing political processes that lead to civil conﬂict. While we do not add
directly to the empirical literature, our framework oﬀers new insights of relevance for the
theory.Globalization and domestic conﬂict 3
autarky and free trade. One possibility is that free trade induces less arm-
ing and less domestic conﬂict, in which case free trade would unambiguously
yield higher welfare. The other possibility is that free trade induces more
arming and conﬂict; in this case, when comparing the two trading regimes,
the familiar gains to trade must be balanced against the increased costs of
arming and conﬂict. Some of our main ﬁndings are summarized below.
First, countries importing the contested resource under free trade un-
ambiguously gain relative to the autarkic regime. In addition to realizing
the regular gains from trade, such countries also experience a reduction in
their costs of conﬂict. To be more precise, because the price of the contested
resource is lower in international markets than it would be under autarky,
removing the barriers to trade with other nations paciﬁes the conﬂict at
home, thereby increasing welfare by more than it would were property rights
perfectly and costlessly enforced.
Second, countries exporting the contested resource under free trade could
lose in comparison to autarky. The closer the international price of the
contested resource is to its autarkic price, the more likely is such an outcome.
At the autarkic price, there are no gains from trade, and the level of conﬂict
under the two regimes are identical. But, as the international price of the
contested resource rises above the autarkic price, a shift to free trade implies
a discrete jump in the stakes of the contest to intensify domestic conﬂict
so that its costs are higher than the gains from trade. Only when the
international price of the contested resource rises above some threshold are
the gains from trade suﬃciently high to compensate for the (still increasing)
costs of conﬂict, so that trade becomes preferable to autarky.
Third, an increase in the international price of the contested resource can
reduce the exporting country’s welfare. More likely when the international
price is especially close to its value under autarky, this eﬀect is reminiscent
of the “natural resource curse”—that is, the tendency for natural-resource
abundant countries to have weak economic growth (see, for example, Sachs
and Warner 1995 and Ross, 2003). The reduced welfare reﬂects an increase
in the intensity with which groups contest the resource as its value rises in
global markets, generating a higher cost of conﬂict that swamps the larger
gains from trade that also come with the higher price.7
7Dal B´ o and Dal B´ o (2004) similarly ﬁnd that an increase in the international price of
the natural resource can induce a greater degree of conﬂict; however, the source and the
nature of conﬂict in their analysis diﬀer from ours. The particular mechanism we study
is closer to that featured in Hodler’s (2004) analysis of rivaling groups, but his focus is on
a closed economy. Also see Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik (2002), who show how the curseGlobalization and domestic conﬂict 4
Fourth, for a certain range of international prices, domestic conﬂict re-
verses the country’s comparative advantage relative to that which we would
observe if the groups within that country co-existed peacefully. To be more
precise, over that price range, if the groups’ claims to the natural resource
were perfectly secure or costlessly enforced, the country would be a net-
importer of oil; however, under imperfect property-rights enforcement, the
country is instead a net-exporter of oil. More generally, whether the inter-
national price of oil falls within that range or not, domestic conﬂict distorts
production decisions, to reduce the quantity of other commodities supplied
domestically relative to the aggregate domestic supply of the contested re-
source, thereby generating a larger excess supply of the contested resource
available for export. That is to say, domestic conﬂict imparts a positive bias
on the country’s exports of that good relative to the benchmark case of no
conﬂict. Our analysis implies, then, that a country’s trade pattern is not
invariant to the emergence of domestic conﬂict. Treating the trade pattern
of any of the many countries that experience civil wars and other forms of
domestic conﬂict as indicative of their true comparative advantage either in
empirical studies or for policy purposes appears unjustiﬁed.
Finally, as the degree of insecurity increases, the range of international
prices for which autarky is superior to free trade and the range over which
the natural resource curse occurs widen. In addition, a country that is
richer in “oil,” given its labor endowment and the degree of insecurity, has a
lower threshold that would make the country vulnerable to greater openness.
Thus, both endowments and “institutions,” the latter in the form of security,
determine the welfare consequences of globalization.
2 The basic setting: contesting a resource
We present our analysis in the context of a highly simpliﬁed version Heckscher-
Ohlin model of trade, modiﬁed to allow for imperfect property rights enforce-
ment. Despite the simplicity of the model, our ﬁndings are qualitatively
robust, and in the appendix, we show how the results can be generalized in
a fully-extended version of the Heckscher-Ohlin model [see Appendix A.2].
Consider a country in which N groups compete for claims to T0 units of
land. Each group i = 1,2,...,N is endowed with Ti and Li units of secure
land and labor, respectively, which can be used to produce consumption
is associated only with countries that have weak institutions. For a mechanism based on
electoral politics and for references to the literature, see Robinson, Torvik, and Verdier
(2003).Globalization and domestic conﬂict 5
goods. For simplicity, we assume here that there is only one potential use
for land, the extraction of oil, and that one unit of land yields one unit of oil.
Labor, however, can be used to produce, also on a one-to-one basis, butter
as well as guns. Let Gi denote group i’s level of arming or guns.8 Then,
Li − Gi (≥ 0) units of labor will be available for the production of butter;
therefore, group i’s maximal production of butter will be max{Li − Gi,0}.
Oil and butter are ﬁnal consumption goods, produced under perfectly
competitive conditions. They can be traded domestically or, depending
on the trade regime, internationally. Let Oi and Bi represent group i’s
consumption of oil and butter respectively. The preferences of each group i
take the Cobb-Douglas form,
U(Oi,Bi) = (Oi)α(Bi)β (1)
where α ∈ (0,1) and α + β = 1.
All groups would like to take control of the contested territory, T0, for
its oil. We rule out the possibility of contracting, whereby the groups could
limit arming, and suppose instead that claims on land can be settled only
via overt conﬂict or, equivalently in our model, under the threat of con-
ﬂict. The inability to contract on arming can be due to a variety of reasons
that are usually associated with weak governance and inadequate institu-
tions of conﬂict management. Each group will have an incentive to allocate
resources to arming in order to enhance its probability of winning T0. But
the production of guns is costly—to produce more guns a group must forego
some production of butter. We will examine how the groups balance these
eﬀects at the margin and how trade openness changes the incentives for
guns-versus-butter production. As will become obvious below, these incen-
tives depend critically on the ratio of insecure land in the country, T0, to the
country’s aggregate endowment of land, ¯ T ≡ T0 +
PN
i=1 Ti. Henceforth, we
will refer to this ratio as the degree of insecurity, and denote it by τ = T0/¯ T.
We model intergroup interactions as a winner-take-all contest in which
the probability, qi, that group i will emerge as the winner depends on the rel-
ative amount of guns the group possesses. Group i’s probability of winning
is speciﬁed as follows:






8Note that “guns” can stand for any costly appropriative activity, such as such as ordi-
nary rent-seeking, inﬂuence activities or litigation, that subtracts from useful production
and welfare. These are precisely the costs of enforcement.Globalization and domestic conﬂict 6
for
PN
j=1 Gj > 0; otherwise qi = 1
N for all i, where G−i denotes the vector of
guns that excludes Gi. According to this speciﬁcation, group i’s probability
of winning is increasing in its own allocation to arms, qi
Gi > 0, and decreasing
in the allocation to arms by all other groups, qi
Gj < 0, j 6= i.9
The timing of actions is as follows:
1. Each group i chooses its allocation of labor to the production to guns,
Gi, i = 1,2,...,N. Groups make their choices simultaneously. Let G
denote the vector of all groups’ gun choices. The implied production
of butter for each group i is max{Li − Gi,0}, for i = 1,2,...,N.
2. Given the choices of guns (G) and the technology of intergroup conﬂict
as described in equation (2), one group emerges as the “winner” of the
contest and takes control of the disputed land; if group i is the winner,
its land endowment and thus production of oil are Ti +T0; otherwise,
its land endowment and production of oil are Ti.
3. Then, given the production of butter and oil by all groups, competitive
trade takes place.
We examine the incentives to arm and the resultant welfare of each group
under two polar trade regimes: autarky and free trade. Under autarky, there
is no trade with the outside world, and prices are determined domestically
within an integrated market. Under free trade, assuming that the country
is small, prices are given in international markets.
To derive the expected payoﬀs under these two regimes, we need to
ﬁrst identify the indirect utility functions implied by (1) and describe some
of their properties. To proceed, let e Ti denote group i’s contingent land
endowment. As previously described,
e Ti =

Ti + T0 if group i emerges as the winner in the contest;
Ti otherwise.
Furthermore, let p denote the relative price of oil measured in units of butter.
The production structure speciﬁed above implies that the marginal product
9First introduced by Tullock (1980), this functional form has been used extensively in
the rent-seeking literature as well as in the literatures on tournaments and conﬂict and






j), where f(·) is a non-negative, increasing function. Also
see Hirshleifer (1989), who investigates the properties of two important functional forms
of this class, including the “ratio success function,” where f(G) = G
m with m > 0, which
simpliﬁes to (2) when m = 1.Globalization and domestic conﬂict 7
of guns and the opportunity cost of labor are identically given by 1. We can
now write group i’s contingent income or revenue function as
Ri ≡ R(p, e Ti,Li − Gi) = p e Ti + Li − Gi. (3)
Abstracting from international transfers of income, aggregate expenditure
on butter and oil must be equal to this measure of income or GDP.10 Impos-
ing this constraint at the group level, group i’s contingent indirect utility
function implied by (1) can be written as
V i ≡ V (p,R(p, e Ti,Li − Gi)) = µ(p)
h
p e Ti + Li − Gi
i
, (4)
where µ(p) = ββ(α/p)α represents each group’s marginal utility of income.
One can verify that group i’s contingent demand and supply functions for oil
are respectively αRi/p and e Ti; therefore, group i’s excess demand function





− e Ti, (5)
which is positive if the group demands oil and negative if it supplies it.11
Diﬀerentiation of group i’s indirect utility function with respect to the
relative price, p, and its guns, Gi, using Roy’s identity, yields




The ﬁrst term inside the brackets weighted by the marginal utility of income
(µ(p)) represents the welfare eﬀect of an exogenous price increase. If group
i’s excess demand for oil (Mi) is positive, the eﬀect is negative; otherwise,
the eﬀect is positive. The second term inside the brackets similarly weighted
by the marginal utility of income represents the marginal cost of producing
an additional gun to group i, given e Ti. When group i produces more guns,
10GDP, as typically measured, includes expenditures on arming. Since such expendi-
tures are not productive and arms are not directly consumed, their inclusion in GDP
makes this aggregate a misleading measure of welfare.
11It is worth noting at this point that our assumption that the utility function is ho-
mogeneous of degree one implies that each group behaves as if it is risk neutral. To be
more precise, for any given choice of guns, each group i would be indiﬀerent between (a)
engaging in actual conﬂict where q
i equals the probability it will win the entire plot of
the contested land and (b) dividing the contested land in which case q
i equals group i’s
share. The reader is free to use either interpretation of the model.Globalization and domestic conﬂict 8
its production of butter must fall, implying less income and a reduction in
its overall welfare.12
Given the allocation of resources to the production of guns by all groups
i = 1,2,...,N, (G), the relative price of oil that solves
PN
i=1 Mi = 0 is
the market-clearing price that will prevail in the country in the absence
of international trade (autarky). Denoting that price by pA, where “A”










To draw out some of the implications of this expression, deﬁne the following
aggregates: ¯ L ≡
PN
i=1 Li and ¯ GA ≡
PN
i=1 Gi
A. Then, the autarkic price, pA,








As revealed by (7), pA does not depend on the distribution of either labor or
land across groups, nor does it depend on the distribution of guns. Instead,
it depends only on the aggregate quantities. Note, in particular, that when
a greater share of the country’s resources are allocated to the production
of guns ¯ G, given the aggregate labor endowment ¯ L, the amount of butter
produced domestically necessarily falls; hence pA depends negatively on the
aggregate level of guns. This property holds more generally, as long as gun
production uses labor more intensively relative to the country’s endowment
[see Appendix A.2 for the more general model].
3 The no-conﬂict case as a benchmark
Before going on to examine what occurs under conﬂict, it is helpful for
later comparisons as well as for developing some intuition for our results to
consider brieﬂy the no-conﬂict or “Nirvana” case in which property rights
are perfectly secure—that is, when there is no dispute over land (τ = 0)
such that groups have no incentive to arm ( ¯ G = 0). In this hypothetical




β ¯ L/¯ T = α
βl (8)
12Notice from (5) that the group’s (contingent) excess demand for oil depends on, among











Figure 1: Free trade without conﬂict
where l ≡ ¯ L/¯ T indicates the country’s aggregate labor-land endowment
ratio. In turn, summing (3) across the N groups shows that, under autarky
with complete security, the country’s national income is ¯ Rn
A = pn
A ¯ T + ¯ L =
l






β ¯ T, (9)
where as previously deﬁned, µ(p) ≡ ββ(α/p)α.13 The welfare of the individ-
ual groups can similarly be written as functions of their initial endowments.
In the case of identical groups, the welfare of each one would be ¯ Wn
A/N.
Under free trade, the relative price of oil p would be determined in in-
ternational markets. Then, with the maintained assumption of complete
security of land endowments, aggregate welfare, again calculated using (4),
would be
¯ Wn
T (p) = µ(p)(p¯ T + ¯ L) = µ(p)(p + l)¯ T. (10)
Supposing that groups are identical, the welfare of each would be ¯ Wn
T (p)/N.
As one can easily verify, ¯ Wn
T (p) is a convex function of p, reaching its mini-
mum at pn
A, as depicted in Figure 1. To the left of pn
A where the international
price of oil is lower than the autarkic price, the country would import oil
13With this deﬁnition and the solution for the price in the no-conﬂict case under autarky
(8), the country’s aggregate welfare in this benchmark case simpliﬁes as ¯ W
n
A = ¯ L
β ¯ T
α.Globalization and domestic conﬂict 10
and export butter. To the right of pn
A, where the international price of oil is
higher than the autarkic price, the country would be an exporter of oil and
an importer of butter. Clearly, in the hypothetical case where the groups’
land endowments are perfectly secure, welfare would be at least as high
under free trade as that under autarky.
4 Conﬂict under alternative trading regimes
We now consider the case where the groups’ land endowments are insecure:
τ > 0. First we examine the equilibrium allocation of resources under the
regime of autarky and then we move on to the equilibrium allocation under
the regime of free trade.
4.1 Autarky
Under autarky, given the country’s aggregate level of guns, ¯ GA, the relative
price of oil is given by (7) regardless of the outcome of the conﬂict over
the contested land, T0. Group i’s land endowment will equal Ti + T0 with
probability qi(Gi,G−i) and Ti with probability 1−qi(Gi,G−i). Then, from




pA(Ti + qiT0) + Li − Gi
, (11)
where, as deﬁned above, G represents the vector of gun choices by all groups
i = 1,2,...,N. We suppose that each group factors in the eﬀect that its
own choice of guns has on the relative price, pA. However, groups make their
choices simultaneously. Given our speciﬁcations for production, preferences,
and the contest success function, a unique Nash equilibrium can be shown
to exist.
At an interior optimum Gi∗
A ∈ (0,Li), the following condition is satisﬁed










+ Li − Gi∗
A












where c Mi denotes group i’s expected excess demand for oil. That is,




pA(Ti + qiT0) + Li − Gi∗
A

− (Ti + qiT0),Globalization and domestic conﬂict 11
derived analogously to (5) using Roy’s identity. The ﬁrst term inside the
brackets in the last line of (12) represents the net expected marginal beneﬁt
of guns, keeping the autarkic price pA constant. As described earlier, the
production of an additional gun enhances group i’s chances of taking control
of the disputed land, T0 and the oil contained therein. As long as the relative
price of oil pA is not too low, this expected net beneﬁt is positive. The second
term inside the brackets represents the indirect eﬀect that an additional gun
would have on group i’s expected payoﬀ through its eﬀect on the relative
price of oil. The sign of this indirect eﬀect depends on whether the group is
a net buyer c Mi > 0 or seller c Mi < 0 of oil.
When groups are identical, no one group can expect to be a net seller or
buyer of oil. Hence, each group’s expected excess demand for oil must equal
zero: c Mi = 0, for all i.14 In this case, groups behave as if they can have
no inﬂuence on the country’s autarkic price. That is to say, the equilibrium
quantity of guns satisﬁes the condition, qi
GipAT0 − 1 = 0.15 That quantity






ατ(N − 1)¯ L





βN + ατ(N − 1)
. (13b)
for i = 1,2,...,N, where as previously deﬁned τ ≡ T0/¯ T > 0 indicates
the degree of insecurity. Not surprisingly, the optimizing choice of guns,
G∗
A, is positively related to the autarkic price of land and oil. The autarkic
price itself, p∗
A, is increasing in the aggregate labor endowment, ¯ L, and
is decreasing in the degree of insecurity, τ, and in the number of groups in
competition, N. In addition, p∗
A is strictly less than the autarkic price under
“Nirvana”, pn







βN + ατ(N − 1)
< 1 (14)
14Interpreting the conﬂict over T0 as a winner-take-all contest, there will be ex post
heterogeneity and thus the groups would be expected to trade after the conﬂict outcome
is realized. In particular, the group that takes control of the land and thus oil would
be expected to be a net seller of oil, whereas all other groups would be expected to be
net buyers. When we interpret q
i as shares instead of probabilities, the assumption that
groups are identical ex ante would imply that they are identical ex post. Hence, there
would be no trade: M
i = c M
i = 0 ∀ i.
15Even if groups were not identical, this condition would be the relevant one, provided
that each group were a price taker in its choice of guns.Globalization and domestic conﬂict 12
is also decreasing in the degree of insecurity, τ, as well as in the number of
groups, N. The eﬀects of τ and N on the ratio p∗
A/pn
A can be attributed to
labor being an essential input into the production of guns. Speciﬁcally, with
an increase in either τ or N, which under conﬂict increases the incentive to
arm, additional resources are diverted away from the production of butter,
implying a higher relative price of butter or equivalently a lower relative
price of oil.
Proceeding to the more general case which allows for asymmetries, we





























Note that, in the ﬁrst line of the expression, ∂pA/∂Gi can be factored out
of the sum of c Mi since, by (7), its value is independent of i. The second line
in the expression then follows from the domestic market-clearing condition, PN
i=1 c Mi = 0. By the speciﬁcation of the conﬂict technology in (2), we have
qi
Gi =
 ¯ G − Gi









¯ G − N

= 0.
We can now combine (7) and the above expression to obtain solutions re-




ατ(N − 1)¯ L
βN + ατ(N − 1)




βN + ατ(N − 1)
. (16b)
As (16) reveals, in the Nash equilibrium under autarky when no group ex-
hausts its entire labor endowment in the production of guns or equivalently
when the resource constraint Li−Gi∗
A ≥ 0 binds for no group i = 1,2,...,N,
both the market-clearing price and the aggregate quantity of guns are inde-
pendent of the distribution of endowments across groups.Globalization and domestic conﬂict 13
Substitution of the aggregate solutions (16) into (12), after simplifying,








β ¯ T + α(N − 1)(αLi − βp∗
ATi)





which is strictly less than Li, by assumption. The interior autarkic equilib-
rium, then, is fully described by this expression, the equilibrium aggregate
quantity of guns, ¯ G∗
A, shown in (16a) and the equilibrium relative price of
oil, p∗
A, shown in (16b). For future reference, we denote group i’s equilib-
rium expected payoﬀ under this regime by Wi∗






βN + ατ(N − 1)
 ¯ TNl
βN + ατ(N − 1)
, (18)
where µ(·) represents the marginal utility of income as deﬁned earlier. It
is straightforward to show that autarkic aggregate welfare in the absence of
conﬂict, ¯ Wn
A, is always greater than autarkic aggregate welfare under con-
ﬂict, ¯ W∗
A.16 As such, when groups are identical, the welfare of any individual
group would be lower under conﬂict as well.17
The following proposition summarizes our main ﬁndings thus far:
Proposition 1 (Autarky) Suppose that barriers preclude trade between
countries, but groups within a given country may trade freely.
(i). The autarkic price under conﬂict (p∗
A) is strictly less than the autarkic
price in the absence of conﬂict (pn
A) and is decreasing in the degree
of insecurity (τ). Furthermore, the ratio of p∗
A to pn
A, as shown in
equation (14), is also decreasing in the degree of insecurity.
(ii). Autarkic aggregate welfare in the absence of conﬂict, ¯ Wn
A, is always
higher than autarkic aggregate welfare under conﬂict, ¯ W∗
A.
16Using the simpliﬁed solution for ¯ W
n∗
A shown in footnote 13, it is possible to rewrite
(18) as ¯ W
∗
A = ¯ W
n∗
A φ where φ ≡ [Nβ/(Nβ + ατ(N − 1))]
β. Since φ < 1, it follows that
¯ W
∗
A < ¯ W
n∗
A .
17With variation across groups, there is no unique set of comparisons because, for each
set of secure endowments and contested land, there is no unique set of land endowments
that could be assigned to the no-conﬂict case.Globalization and domestic conﬂict 14
4.2 Free trade
Under free trade, each group can trade, without restrictions, butter and oil at
a relative price p which is determined in international markets. Moreover, we
suppose that this price cannot be inﬂuenced by any group or by the country
as a whole. In other words, the country can be considered “small”.18 Using




p(Ti + qiT0) + Li − Gi
, (19)
where as deﬁned above G represents the vector of gun choices by all groups





GipT0 − 1) = 0,
from which we can solve for the equilibrium production of guns under trade





(N − 1)pτ ¯ T
N2 , (20)
for all i, where τ ≡ T0/¯ T. Note that, even when the secure land endowments
are not identically distributed across groups, this equilibrium is symmetric.
That is, provided the relevant resource constraint is satisﬁed, groups of
diﬀerent sizes will produce the same quantity of guns.
What relevant resource constraints do we have in mind? Since groups
have, by assumption, access to international markets, it seems reasonable to
suppose that they can trade the right to obtain guns beyond what can be
obtained domestically (that is, beyond Li), against the oil that can be ob-
tained from the group’s secure land endowment (Ti) alone, or even against
the oil that the group expects to obtain from its participation in the do-
mestic conﬂict (qi(Gi,G−i)T0). As Collier et. al. (2003, p. 77) state: “A
particularly remarkable recent development is for rebel groups to raise ﬁ-
nance by selling the advance rights to the extraction of minerals that they
currently do not control, but which they propose to control by purchasing
armaments ﬁnanced through the sale of extraction rights.” Former Presi-
dent of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lawrence Kabila, ﬁnanced his
18Supposing that the groups and the country as a whole are large enough to aﬀect inter-
national prices, and that they recognize their eﬀects in their strategic decisions would un-
necessarily complicate our derivations without qualitatively changing our results. Skaper-
das and Syropoulos (2002) allow for a strong eﬀect of individual players on prices in a
model similar to the one of this paper.Globalization and domestic conﬂict 15
rebellion against Mobutu Sese Seko with such a scheme. Similarly, Ross
(2003, p. 33) cites reports of former President of Congo-Brazzaville Denis
Sassou-Nguesso ﬁnancing his private militias through pledges of future oil
contracts, whereby he was able to come to power. Over the past decade,
buying arms in international markets has become far easier than it had been
in the past. Indeed, there now exist international private security ﬁrms that
oﬀer comprehensive packages, including everything from tactical advisors to
whole units complete with attack helicopters and jets. Such military ”im-
ports” have been decisive factors in countries like Sierra Leone and Angola
[see Davis 2000 and Singer 2003].
Provided that groups are suﬃciently similar, these expanded opportuni-
ties for them to obtain arms ensure the symmetric solution in (20) always
obtains in equilibrium under free trade.19 Accordingly, group i’s equilibrium
expected payoﬀ in this regime, Wi






















T is the same for all i, each group has an equal chance of securing
T0. Thus, as (21) and (22) show, any variation in secure endowments across
groups will generate variation in welfare under free trade for any given price.
Again, for ease of comparison, we focus on the case of identical groups,
implying that aggregate welfare and the (unique) minimum price become
19Speciﬁcally, if land endowments as well as expected contested land capture can be
used as collateral to obtain guns beyond L






i for all i. Suﬃcient symmetry across the groups in
terms of the distribution of secure endowments ensures that the right-hand-side of this
inequality is negative such that the constraint could not bind for any positive prices p.
Even with considerable variation in the distribution of endowments, the condition may
hold. However, this is less likely, as the price for oil increases and the conﬂict over land
intensiﬁes. Of course, in the absence of the opportunities provided, for example, by the
international private security ﬁrms, the relevant resource constraint for the symmetric
equilibrium shown in (20) to be an equilibrium is that the relative price be suﬃciently
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respectively








 ¯ T (23a)
= ¯ Wn
T (p) − µ(p)pN−1
N τ ¯ T (23b)
pmin =
αNl
βN − βτ(N − 1)
(23c)
Then, the properties described below follow straightforwardly.
Proposition 2 (Free Trade) Suppose the competing groups are identical.
(i). The international price that minimizes the country’s aggregate welfare
under trade and conﬂict (pmin) is strictly greater than the autarkic
(and minimum) price in the absence of conﬂict (pn
A), and is increasing












βN + ατ(N − 1)
βN − βτ(N − 1)
are both increasing in the degree of insecurity, τ.
(ii). For any given international price p, aggregate welfare under conﬂict,
¯ WT(p), is strictly lower than aggregate welfare in the absence of con-
ﬂict, ¯ Wn
T (p). Furthermore, the higher is the degree of insecurity, the
lower is ¯ WT(p).
Part (ii) of Proposition 2 is to be expected, as insecurity induces arming that
reduces welfare. The interpretation and signiﬁcance of part (i) will become
evident in the comparisons we undertake in the next section.
5 Comparing the two trading regimes under conﬂict
Having characterized the allocation of resources under the two polar trading
regimes, we are now ready to compare them in terms of both arming and
welfare. For tractability, we will only consider the case of identical groups.
The comparison reveals two key forces at play here: (i) the well known gains
from trade that favor trade over autarky, as was demonstrated above in the
benchmark case without conﬂict; and (ii) the induced eﬀects of trade on the
groups’ incentive to ﬁght over the contested resource, which may or may not
favor the trade over autarky.Globalization and domestic conﬂict 17
Consider ﬁrst the level of arming. Note that, whereas guns under autarky
depend only on the endowments and other parameters of the model as shown
in (13a), guns under free-trade critically depend on the relative price p and
negatively so as shown in (20). Using (13a) and (20), we calculate the ratio of











As this expression shows, the groups’ optimizing allocation to guns under
anarchy is lower than that under free-trade if and only if the international
relative price of guns is higher than its domestic autarkic price.
The logic here is straightforward: A high price of oil induces more guns
production both because guns are cheaper to produce and because land
and oil are more valuable in international markets and thus induce more
competition for the capture of the contested land. When the international
price p is higher than the autarkic price p∗
A (θ < 1), the groups and the
country as a whole import butter and export oil. By contrast, when p is
lower than p∗
A (θ > 1), butter is more valuable in the international market
than it is domestically, and oil is less valuable internationally than it is in
the domestic market. The groups and the country, therefore, export butter
and import oil, and they use less labor in the production of guns than they
would under autarky.
Moving on to the relative appeal of free trade, note that the payoﬀs under
autarky would equal the payoﬀs under trade if the international price were
the same as the autarkic price: ¯ WT(p∗
A) = ¯ W∗
A. Since ¯ WT(p) is convex in p
and obtains its minimum at pmin, how welfare under free trade, ¯ WT(p), ranks
relative to welfare under autarky, ¯ W∗
A, depends on how pmin is related to the
autarkic price p∗
A. In particular, if these two prices were to coincide, then the
expected payoﬀs under autarky would fall below the expected payoﬀs under
trade everywhere except at that minimum price. However, from Proposition
2 part (i) we have pmin > pn
A and from Proposition 1 part (i) we have
pn
A > p∗
A. Therefore, we must have pmin > p∗
A, implying that there exists
some range of international prices for which the groups are better oﬀ under
autarky than under trade.
But we can be more precise in characterizing this range of prices. In
particular, given the convexity of ¯ WT(p), there exists another price p0 > pmin
deﬁned uniquely by the condition, ¯ WT(p0) = ¯ W∗
A. Therefore, as illustrated
in Figure 2, for all ˜ p ∈ (p∗
A,p0), the expected payoﬀs under free trade are
lower than the payoﬀs expected under autarky ( ¯ WT(˜ p) < ¯ W∗


















Figure 2: Free trade with conﬂict
prices outside that interval the payoﬀs expected under trade are at least as
high as those expected under under autarky.
We summarize the key implications of our analysis as they relate to the
welfare comparison of the two regimes in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 (Relative Appeal of Free Trade) Suppose the competing
groups are identical.
(i). When the international price of oil p is lower than p∗
A or higher than
p0, welfare under free trade is higher than welfare under autarky.
(ii). When the international price of oil is between p∗
A and p0, welfare under
autarky is higher than welfare under free trade.




is increasing the degree of insecurity τ as well. Thus, the range of
prices for which autarky dominates trade is increasing in the degree of
insecurity.
When the international price for oil p is lower than its autarkic price
(p∗
A), the production of guns under trade is lower. In this case, removing
the barriers to trade reduces the groups’ incentives to ﬁght over the contestedGlobalization and domestic conﬂict 19
resource, implying that domestic conﬂict is less intense. With this beneﬁt
and the familiar gains from trade, there should be no doubt that welfare
is higher than it would be under autarky. However, as the international
price of oil rises, domestic conﬂict intensiﬁes, becoming just as severe as it
is under autarky once the international price reaches the price that would
obtain under autarky (p = p∗
A); at the same time, the gains from trade fall to
zero. It is at this point, as shown in Figure 2, where welfare under autarky
is identical to that under trade.
As the international price continues to rise above the autarkic price, do-
mestic conﬂict intensiﬁes further; while the gains from trade rise above zero,
those gains are not suﬃciently large to compensate for the higher burden
of guns; thus, as the international price of oil rises above its autarkic price,
welfare under trade falls below that which could be obtained under anarchy.
Yet, as Proposition 3 indicates, even further increases in the international
price will eventually make free trade relatively more appealing. That is to
say, when the international price of oil becomes suﬃciently high (p > p0),
the gains from winning the valuable land and selling the oil in the global
marketplace become very large and begin to outweigh the (normalized) op-
portunity cost of guns.
Part (iii) of the Proposition, the proof of which is given in Appendix
A.1, establishes that the range of international prices for which autarky is
superior to trade (p ∈ (p∗,p0)) expands as insecurity (τ) increases, an intu-
itively plausible but non-trivial property. Figure 3 illustrates this property
and also shows how an increase in the degree of insecurity shifts the welfare
curve, assuming trade, down.
One can also verify that the prices p∗
A, pn
A, and pmin are increasing in
the labor-to-land endowment ratio l ≡ ¯ L/¯ T. That is to say, the labor-to-
land endowment ratio aﬀects these critical prices by eﬀectively shifting all
the curves, in the ﬁgures we have shown, to the right. A higher l makes the
range of international prices (those below p∗
A) for which free trade is superior
larger since the country is an importer of oil and an exporter of butter over
that range.20
Another interesting implication, which follows from our previous discus-
sion and is illustrated in Figure 2, concerns the welfare eﬀect of an increase
in the international price of the contested resource.
Proposition 4 (Resource Curse) Suppose the competing groups are iden-
20The eﬀect of l on p
0 is generally ambiguous. But, for large enough l ≡ ¯ L/ ¯ T, p
0 is also























Figure 3: When the degree of insecurity rises
tical. Then, for international prices between p∗
A and pmin, aggregate welfare
under free trade, ¯ W∗
T(p), is decreasing in the international price p.
This ﬁnding is reminiscent of what others (including, but not limited to,
Sachs and Warner 1995 and Ross 2003) have called the “resource curse,”
but is based on a diﬀerent logic. In particular, as suggested earlier, for
p ∈ [p∗
A,pmin), increases in the international price of the contested re-
source induce a greater degree of domestic conﬂict. While the familiar gains
from trade increase with increases in p over this range, these increases are
swamped by the large increases in the burden of guns.
It is important to note, in relation to the resource curse, that national
income under free trade, which is given by
¯ R∗
T(p) = [p(1 − N−1
N τ) + l]¯ T,
is everywhere increasing in the international price p, even over that range
for which welfare is falling. Thus, particularly for p ∈ [p∗
A,pmin), it would
seem that our measure of income tends to overstate welfare. But, there is no
reason to believe that commonly used measures of aggregate income (e.g.,
GDP) do any better. If anything, there is reason to believe that they do
worse. Speciﬁcally, our theoretical construct, in contrast to conventionally
used measures based on national income and product accounts, excludesGlobalization and domestic conﬂict 21
expenditures on arming. Thus, the conventional measures of national income
would tend to overstate welfare by even more than our theoretical measure.
But the point here is not to “advocate” our theoretical measure. Instead,
the point is to note that reports of income founded on conventional income
accounting might not be able to identify fully the extent of the natural
resource curse, and the curse itself might be not only more severe but also
more pervasive, aﬀecting more countries than currently believed.21
Another implication of the analysis that we draw out here is that con-
ﬂict also aﬀects the pattern of trade. Speciﬁcally, when p ∈ (p∗
A,pn
A), the
presence of insecure land endowments reverses the direction of the country’s
comparative advantage relative to the hypothetical scenario where land en-
dowments are perfectly secure. To illustrate this eﬀect, we calculate the
country’s aggregate excess demand for oil under free trade, in the hypo-
thetical case of no conﬂict ( ¯ Mn





















For both cases, ¯ MT(p) is positive when the country imports oil and negative
when it exports oil. As (24a) reveals, in the absence of conﬂict, the country
would export butter and import oil whenever p < pn
A. But (24b) shows that
if, at the same time, p > p∗
A, then under trade with conﬂict, the country
would export oil and import butter. This sharp divergence of trade patterns
depending on the presence of domestic conﬂict is a result of the diversion
of resources (speciﬁcally labor in this model) away from the production
of butter to the production of guns under conﬂict.22 From Proposition 1
part (i), it can be seen that, the range of prices for which the country’s
comparative advantage reverses under conﬂict relative to the hypothetical
21Candidates for this designation would be countries that have, for example, low ranks
in term of the UNDP’s Human Development Index (HDI) compared to their rank in terms
of GDP. Such countries appear to fall into one of either two categories: those that are
signiﬁcant oil exporters (like Saudi Arabia or Angola) and those that have signiﬁcant
domestic cleavages (like Algeria and South Africa). See the table for HDI in: http:
//hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2003/indicator/index.html.
22As noted below, it does not depend on the particular production structure we have
employed. Domestic conﬂict’s sharp eﬀect on the country’s trade pattern would remain
intact as long as there is a diﬀerence in the factor intensities in the production of arms
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case of no-conﬂict is wider for countries having a greater degree of insecurity
τ. But the eﬀects of insecurity trade patterns is not limited to cases where
the price falls within that particular range. Equation (24b) shows that a
country’s excess demand for oil is increasing in p∗
A , which Proposition 1
part (i) indicates is decreasing in the degree of insecurity. Thus, the degree
of insecurity, τ, generally reduces the country’s excess demand for oil. We
summarize these ﬁndings in the following proposition:
Proposition 5 (Trade Pattern Eﬀects) The domestic demand for oil is de-
creasing in the degree of insecurity τ, and the country over-exports oil (rel-
ative to the hypothetical no-conﬂict case). When the international price of
oil is between p∗
A and pn
A, there is a reversal in the country’s comparative
advantage (relative to the no conﬂict case) with the country exporting oil
instead of butter.
In oil-exporting countries where there is domestic conﬂict over that same
resource we would expect these exports to be higher than those that would
obtain in the absence of conﬂict. If, for example, the resources expended
on Nigeria’s civil wars and the various other forms of domestic conﬂict that
have been present there over the years were instead used in production, the
local economy would have absorbed more of the oil production and less of
it would have been exported.
As shown in the Appendix [A.2], this trade-pattern eﬀect extends to
more general production functions for guns, as well as for butter and oil.
Within the standard Heckscher-Ohlin model of trade, all that is required
is that the land-labor factor intensity of gun production be lower than the
labor-land country endowment ratio, l ≡ ¯ L/¯ T.
6 Concluding remarks
Since 1945, 127 civil wars (each causing, by deﬁnition, at least 1,000 deaths)
have emerged in 73 countries. The total number of casualties resulting
directly from these wars is conservatively estimated to be at least 16.2 mil-
lion.23 The accompanying direct and indirect economic costs have also been
immense. These wars have not abated since the end of the Cold War; they
23See Fearon and Laitin (2003, p.75) who base their ﬁndings on the Correlates of War
project, among other sources. Using Singer and Singer (1994) updated to include the
Kargil and Eritrean wars, they report further that the same period witnessed a much
smaller number of interstate wars, with proportionately fewer casualties. This trend rep-
resents a reversal from the ﬁrst 45 years of the twentieth century.Globalization and domestic conﬂict 23
have spread into Eastern Europe and Central Asia (Collier at. al, 2003,
Ch.4), and many pre-existing wars last longer than they had in the past
[Fearon and Laitin, 2003]. Furthermore, low-level insurgencies, civil unrest,
and more conventional forms of domestic conﬂict are present in an addi-
tionally large number of countries, and these have their own added costs
(Rodrik, 1999).
Our results suggest that globalization in the presence of domestic conﬂict
is not the unmitigated good that it was shown to be within the context
of traditional trade models where all endowments are seen to be perfectly
secure. Although for importers of oil and other natural resources opening up
the economy brings the regular beneﬁts of trade and reductions in conﬂict,
for exporters of the same resources opening the economy to trade can very
well induce a large diversion of productive resources to conﬂict that more
than oﬀsets the familiar gains from trade. Welfare can even be decreasing
while the price of the exported resource is increasing, and the country in
conﬂict might be exporting a good that it would be importing in the absence
of conﬂict.
The increase in domestic conﬂict observed in the post-war period is
also correlated with the emergence of weak new post-colonial and post-
communist states that have been unable to develop the legal infrastructure,
enforcement, and institutions which would be expected to manage the var-
ious conﬂicts. As even the strong states of high-income countries are said
to be weakening in many of the same dimensions (see, e.g., Van Creveld,
1999), it is doubtful that the governance of security can be signiﬁcantly im-
proved in low-income countries without qualitative changes in the way the
international economy is governed.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 3, part (iii).
As noted earlier, p0 is deﬁned by WT(p0) = W∗
A, which, using (18) for W∗
A
and (23a) for WT(p0), can be written as

βNl






p0(1 − τ N−1
N ) + l

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The expression on the right hand side of the equality above is strictly pos-
itive, implying A > 0. To sign B, note that (23c) implies pmin = αl/β[1 −
τ N−1
N ]. From the inequality p0 > pmin, it follows that p0β





and therefore B < 0. With (A.2), the inequalities A > 0 and B < 0, in turn,
imply that the price p0 is increasing in the degree of security τ: ∂p0/∂τ > 0.
Then, with Proposition 1 part (i), that p∗
A is decreasing in τ, one can verify
that the ratio, p0/p∗
A, is increasing in τ. k
A.2 General production structures and patterns of trade
Here we outline an extension of our model in which the production struc-
ture is generalized along the lines of the standard Heckscher-Ohlin model of
trade, to show how our results regarding the pattern of trade extend with
some qualiﬁcations. As before, denote the relative price of oil (measured in
units of butter) by p. Now let the price of labor and the price of land be
denoted respectively by w and r, and assume that all commodities can be
produced using land and labor with constant returns to scale technologies.
For speciﬁcity, identify the corresponding technologies for the production
of these goods, J = O,B,G, with the unit cost functions cJ ≡ cJ(w,r),
which we assume are linear homogeneous and concave in their arguments.
By Shephard’s lemma, cJ
w and cJ
r indicate respectively the (conditional) unit
labor and unit land requirements in the production of good J, where the
subscript denotes the partial derivative of the cost function with respect to
that factor price. The linear homogeneity of cJ implies that the unit labor
and land requirements are homogenous of degree zero and further that the
labor-land factor intensity ratio in industry J, lJ ≡ cJ
w/cJ
r, is decreasing in
the wage-rental ratio, ω ≡ w/r.
Within this more generalized production structure, supposing that la-
bor (land) is employed intensively in the production of butter (oil)—that is,
lB(ω) > lO(ω) for all relevant ω—we identify the conditions under which (i)Globalization and domestic conﬂict 25
the autarkic relative price of oil in the presence of conﬂict continues to be
below that which obtains in the “Nirvana” case; and, (ii) there is a tendency
to over-export oil in the presence of conﬂict relative to the Nirvana case.24
The key condition for both results, given lB(ω) > lO(ω), is that the coun-
try’s (and, under symmetry, the representative group’s) labor-land factor
endowment ratio l ≡ ¯ L/¯ T is higher than the labor-land factor intensity
ratio in the production of guns: lG = cG
w/cG
r . Otherwise, the results are
reversed. Either way, we can see that the country’s pattern of trade will
depend on the presence of conﬂict.
A.2.1 The eﬀect of conﬂict on the autarkic price
Focusing on diversiﬁed production for oil and butter, with the price of butter
normalized to one, competitive pricing requires
cO(w,r) = p (A.3a)
cB(w,r) = 1. (A.3b)
Under our assumptions, these two conditions together deﬁne the equilibrium
values of w and r as a functions of product prices. An application of the
implicit function theorem to (A.3) conﬁrms, consistent with the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem, that an exogenous increase in the relative price of the
oil (p) generates a disproportionate increase in the reward to the factor
employed intensively in this industry (land), while reducing the real reward
paid to the other factor (labor): prp/r > 1 and wp < 0, where the subscript
denotes the partial derivative with respect to that variable.
Let ¯ XJ ≡
PN
i=1 Xi
J denote the country’s aggregate output of J = O,B,
and recall that ¯ G ≡
PN
i=1 Gi indicates the country’s aggregate allocation
to guns.25 Then, given the quantities of labor and land resources allocated
produce ¯ G, factor-market clearing requires the residual quantities of labor
and land, ¯ L−cG
w and ¯ T−cG
r ¯ G, be allocated to the production of consumption
goods, ¯ XJ J = B,O, as follows:
cO
w ¯ XO + cB
w ¯ XB = ¯ L − cG
w ¯ G (A.4a)
cO
r ¯ XO + cB
r ¯ XB = ¯ T − cG
r ¯ G (A.4b)
24While consistent with the production structure speciﬁed in the main text, this as-
sumption on factor intensities is not as restrictive and, moreover, is not important for the
central result of the paper that trade openness can aggravate domestic conﬂict.




B denote group i’s output levels of oil and
butter, respectively, contingent on the realization, e T
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We will later refer to the ratio ¯ lX ≡








land residual factor endowment ratio.
With the country’s factor endowments, ¯ L and ¯ T, the two conditions
shown in (A.4) pin down the aggregate quantities of oil and butter that will
be supplied by the country, ¯ XO and ¯ XB, as functions of ¯ G and p. For our
purposes, it suﬃces to solve these equations for the relative supply of oil
function (measured in units of butter):









lB − ¯ lX

 ¯ lX − lO
. (A.5)
Conﬂict’s eﬀect on the autarkic price operates partly through ¯ G’s eﬀect
inﬂuence on this relative supply of oil. To evaluate this eﬀect, ﬁrst observe
that an increase in aggregate guns, ¯ G, given p, reduces the residual quantities
of both labor and land available for the production of consumption goods.
Nevertheless, we can pin down net eﬀect of the increase in ¯ G on ¯ lX, as it
depends on the diﬀerence between the labor-land factor endowment ratio,








r (l − lG)¯ T
(¯ T − cG
r ¯ G)2 T 0 if l T lG.
Whether positive or negative, the change in ¯ lX then directly aﬀects the









(¯ lX − lO)2 < 0,
where the inequality, consistent with the Rybczynski theorem, follows from
the assumption that labor is employed intensively in the production of but-








S 0 if l T lG. (A.6)
If the labor-land factor endowment ratio is less than the labor-land factor
intensity of guns production, l < lG, an exogenous increase in ¯ G decreases
disproportionately the residual amount of labor available for the production
26One can show more generally, with an application of the implicit function theorem to
(A.4), that an increase in the quantity of land (labor) used to produce oil and butter leads
to disproportionate increase in the output of the industry which uses the factor intensively,
oil (butter), and a decrease in the output by the other industry, butter (oil).Globalization and domestic conﬂict 27
of oil and butter; the resulting decline in ¯ lX implies an increase in the relative
supply of oil, measured in units of butter; otherwise, the eﬀect is reversed.
Next, we derive the equilibrium condition for the relative price of oil
under autarky. Let Ri ≡ R(p, e Ti−cG
r Gi,Li−cG
wGi) denote group i’s revenue
or GDP function contingent on the realization of the outcome of contest for
land, e Ti. As before, this function is the maximized value of the group’s
gross domestic product or, equivalently, the minimized value of the group’s
expenditures on land and labor in the production of oil and butter:
Ri = pXi
O + Xi
B = r[e Ti − cG
r Gi] + w[Li − cG
wGi]. (A.7)
It is well-known that Xi
O = Ri
p, w = Ri
L, and r = Ri
T, where the subscripts
on R denote partial derivatives with respect to that variable [Dixit and
Norman (1980)].27
Maintaining the linear homogeneous speciﬁcation for the representative
consumer’s preferences, group i’s indirect utility function can be written
as V i = µ(p)Ri where as previously deﬁned µ(p) is the marginal utility of
income, with µ0 < 0 and µ00 > 0. From Roy’s identity, group i’s contingent
demand function for oil is Di
O = α(p)Ri/p, where α(p) ≡ −pµ0(p)/µ(p) > 0
is the expenditure share on oil.28 It follows that group i’s excess demand
function for oil is Mi ≡ Di
O − Xi
O = α(p)Ri/p − Ri
p.
When there are no barriers to trade, the international price p is taken
as given. The country as a whole can be either a net importer
PN
i=1 Mi ≡
¯ M( ¯ G,p) > 0 or a net exporter ¯ M( ¯ G,p) < 0. Under autarky, however, the
country can be neither. But since domestic markets are fully integrated, the
autarkic price, pA, is the price, given the allocation of guns by all groups,
that satisﬁes the condition, ¯ M( ¯ G,p) = 0. This condition implicitly deﬁnes
the equilibrium price of oil, p = pA, in units of butter, as a function of the
country’s aggregate endowments, given the aggregate allocation to guns, ¯ G.
To derive that condition, deﬁne the country’s aggregate revenue (or
GDP) function as ¯ R = R(p, ¯ T − cG
r ¯ G, ¯ L − cG
w ¯ G). One can verify that
¯ R ≡
PN
i=1 Ri and further that ¯ Rp =
PN
i=1 Ri
p (= ¯ XO). The condition
27Sharply pronounced asymmetries in the groups’ contingent endowments can induce
complete specialization in the production of oil or butter by some groups. Allowing for
such specialization would require signiﬁcant changes in the analysis. But, to keep focused
on the issues at hand, we consider only the case of diversiﬁed production.





i is utility and e
0(p) > 0, e
00(p) < 0 where primes denote derivatives.
One can easily verify: (1) µ(p) ≡ 1/e(p); (2) α(p) ≡ −pµ
0(p)/µ(p) = pe
0/e(p) > 0; (3)
pα
0(p)/α(p) + α(p) − 1 = pe
00(p)/e
0(p) < 0.Globalization and domestic conﬂict 28
for the autarkic price is then
¯ M( ¯ G,p) =
α(p)
p













1+ρ, the fraction of the country’s GDP that comes from
oil production. This fraction can be written as a function of the country’s
relative supply of oil. By applying the implicit function theorem (A.8), we




¯ M ¯ G
¯ Mp
(A.9)
Tedious algebra shows that, ¯ Mp < 0, the condition for Walrasian stability,
is satisﬁed.29 Hence, the sign of (A.9) is given by that of ¯ M ¯ G.
From (A.8), market-clearing requires α(p) − p ¯ Rp/ ¯ R = 0. Using that
requirement with the observation that p ¯ Rp/ ¯ R = ρ/(1 + ρ), one can verify






Accordingly, by our assumption that lB > lO, we can use (A.6) to ﬁnd
∂pA
∂ ¯ G
S 0 if l S lG. (A.10)
Thus, consistent with our ﬁnding in the main text, provided that butter
is labor intensive lB > lO and the labor-land factor intensity ratio in the
production of guns exceeds the labor-land factor endowment ratio lG > l,
an exogenous increase in ¯ G implies an increase in pA. It should also be clear
by now that, as before, the autarkic price is independent of the outcome of
the conﬂict. That is, pA is not subject to uncertainty.
29One can use (A.8) to calculate:

























Since ¯ R/p 6= 0, market-clearing requires ¯ Rp = α ¯ R/p. Algebraic manipulations and sub-
stitutions, with that requirement, show that the ﬁrst three terms can be written as
α ¯ R[pα
0/α − 1 + α]/p
2, which is negative since α, the expenditure share for oil, is less
than 1 and decreasing in p [also see footnote 28]. Furthermore, the country’s supply of
oil is increasing in its price, ¯ Rpp > 0. Next, the linear homogeneity of the cost function








rrr/w. As such, one can simplify last two
terms of the expression as −wrc
G
wr (rp/r − wp/w)
2 < 0. Since c
G
wr > 0 and rp > 0, while
wp < 0, this simpliﬁed term is similarly negative. Thus, ¯ Mp < 0Globalization and domestic conﬂict 29
A.2.2 The eﬀect of conﬂict on the pattern of trade
To this point we have derived the equilibrium relationship between the rel-
ative price under autarky and the aggregate quantity of guns. Nothing has
been said, however, about the optimizing choice of guns under either trade
regime.
To proceed, we can deﬁne group i’s expected payoﬀ, as Wi = µ(p)b Ri,
where b Ri is given by (A.7) with ˜ Ti replaced by Ti + qiT0. Focusing on
identical groups, it is straightforward to show that the optimizing choice of









where r depends on p as shown in (A.3). Aggregating this condition across
all groups i, using qi






(N − 1)T0r/ ¯ G − NcG
= 0 (A.11)
It follows that ¯ G∗ = T0
N−1
N (cG/r)−1. Since cG depends on factors prices,
which in turn depend on price p, this solution with the Stolper-Samuelson
























The inequality follows from our assumption that lB > lO, as it implies that
prp/r > 1 and wp < 0. Now note that (A.11) together with (A.8) determine
p∗
A and ¯ G∗
A > 0. (A.11) alone determines ¯ G∗
T > 0. It should now be
fairly clear how trade patterns where conﬂict is present compare with trade
patterns in our hypothetical case.
(i). Suppose that l < lG for all ¯ G ∈ [0, ¯ G∗
A], so that p∗
A < pn
A. Then,
for any world price p ∈ (p∗
A,pn
A) the country will import oil under
“Nirvana” and export oil under conﬂict if it could trade freely in the
world market.
(ii). Suppose that l > lG for all ¯ G ∈ [0, ¯ G∗
A], so that p∗
A > pn
A. Then, for any
world price p ∈ (pn
A,p∗
A), the country will export oil under “Nirvana”
but import oil under free trade with conﬂict.Globalization and domestic conﬂict 30
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